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The subject of the book is "Confucian learning" （ruxue 儒学）, which refers to Confucianism primarily as it is embodied in the activities and writing of academics in China and Taiwan, though Makeham also spends time on recent discussion of "Confucian teaching" （rujiao 儒教 ) and its relation to religion. Lost Soul is divided into four parts. Part 1, "Historical Background," covers events in the 1980s and early 1990s. Makeham stresses the role of Tu Weiming and the impact of efforts to promote Confucian education in Singapore. Even though the institution-building efforts in which Tu participated were ultimately abandoned, they provided a platform for the idea that a "creatively transformed" Confucianism could have renewed relevance in the contemporary world. Another theme is the important role played by mainland scholar Fang Keli. Fang, a Marxist, led important research projects on ruxue -and more specifically on New Confucianism -starting in 1986. Makeham covers the background, motivation, and some of the content of this research. It is in this context that he first introduces his argument that the revival of ruxue in China is not, to any significant degree, the result of a conscious government policy to promote Confucianism as an alternative ideology. Finally, Makeham also looks in some detail at activities in Taiwan, both because of their intrinsic importance and because he observes that rivalry and (more positively) cross-fertilization between scholars on both sides of the Taiwan Straits has played a crucial role in developing and sustaining academic interest in ruxue.
Part 2 is organized around the theme of ruxue and Chinese culture. Makeham begins exploring the degree to which ruxue has been understood as the core of Chinese culture, with special reference to the wide-spread view that ruxue has "thoroughly penetrated every dimension and stratum of traditional society and its institutions" [p. 111] . For such a broad influence to be even conceivable, one suspects that "ruxue" would have to be referring to more than one thing, and indeed, part of Makeham's purpose here is to show the various dimensions or aspects of ruxue that scholars have distinguished. He suggests that these dimensions are typically defined in dyadic terms: politicized versus popular, institutional versus social, official versus unofficial, and so on. In most cases, one dimension is seen as good and worth developing, while the other is problematic and in need of critique or outright rejection. For many analysts, the multidimensional nature of ruxue -and its close tie to "Chinese culture" -enables it to live on into the twentieth century, even after its traditional "body" has died. For example, Makeham cites Chen Lai's argument that Confucian (rujia 儒家) ethics continued in the Nationalist period and even into the Communist era [p. 116] . Another influential approach is that of Li Zehou, who argues that ruxue is "sedimented" into Chinese people's psychological being: it forms the "deep structure" of their thinking [p. 119] . Makeham argues that we can see particular ways in which the equation of ruxue and Chinese culture play out by looking at two prominent mainland academics, Guo Qiyong and Zheng Jiadong. Guo emphasizes the importance of "personally experiencing the historical significance and modern value of ruxue" [p. 134] . One of the important ideas suggested by this phrase is the particular value of ruxue ideals, independent of Marxist theories of philosophy and history. Chinese would do well, he is suggesting, to recognize and recover the values of their culture. At the same time, Guo sees the need for philosophy, ruxue, and Chinese culture to evolve. "Promoting the concept of zhong 忠 [loyalty] does not necessarily imply that one must be loyal to some political authority. This is because zhong can be given a modern meaning" [p. 136] . A major theme that Makeham draws from Zheng Jiadong is the problematic narrowing of ruxue that has come from its intellectualization and professionlization in the twentieth century. Zheng understands the reasons this has happened, but worries about the consequences of cleaving "knowledge" from "moral action" -and only "critical transcendence," "synthetic creation," and so on. As throughout the book, he considers both institution-building and academic activities, as well as specific books and essays in which these ideas are elaborated. His general conclusion is that while talk of synthesis between Marxism and ruxue -and the broad conviction that ruxue is central to Chinese culture -helped to open up some discursive space for the advocacy of ruxue, the theoretical contents of the proposals for "synthetic creation" did not run very deep.
Part 4 is titled "Distinguishing Rujiao and Propogating Ruxue," and is concerned with efforts move ruxue beyond the confines of philosophy or of academia entirely. One chapter is devoted to various efforts to demarcate a purportedly religious "rujiao 儒教" from a more secular "rujia 儒家" (both of which are standardly translated as "Confucianism"). Makeham ascertains that there is little consensus on the use of these terms, and furthermore argues that their prescriptive rather than descriptive use "often thwarts a reliable purchase on historical realities" [p. 309] . His own understanding of "religion in the modern sense" -"in which belief is privileged over practice, is assumed to be present in all cultures, and takes Christianity as its This rapid summary of a complex book has no doubt missed some important points, and has done no more than hint at the vast range of sources -virtually all of them in Chinese -on which Makeham bases his arguments. Let me nonetheless turn now to some engagement with the book's arguments. Makeham summarizes his theses as follows:
First, the process of intellectual cross-fertilization and rivalry between scholars in China and overseas Chinese scholars (particularly in Taiwan) has served to sustain academic interest in ruxue. Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, party-state support in the PRC does not underpin the continuing academic discourse on ruxue. Third, cultural nationalism rather than state nationalism better explains the nature of this activity. Fourth, academic discourse on ruxue provides little evidence of robust philosophical creativity. (Pp. 6-7) All these theses are interesting and on each count Makeham provides detailed evidence and is, in my judgment, substantially correct. We should be careful not to misinterpret the first of these claims, which elsewhere in the book is phrased in a slightly more circumspect fashion: crossfertilization and rivalry is "a key impetus" sustaining the activities he studies in the book [p. 331] .
Furthermore, it is worth noting the difference between "rivalry" and "cross-fertilization."
Makeham shows that rivalry played a role, but he himself notes that it would be "misleading to characterize [the major research projects he discusses] as having been dominated by cross-straits rivalry" [p. 333] . Cross-fertilization is a different kind of process that requires independent sorts of motivation, such as being stimulated by encountering different views or by the challenge of articulating one's own view in a different context.
Makeham's discussion of cultural nationalism, as versus state nationalism or outright party-state support, is subtle, well-documented, and convincing. It is concern with ideas like nation, culture, and Chinese identity, rather than a concern with the Chinese state (or party-state), that has helped to undergird the focus on ruxue we have been discussing. We should take note of one of Makeham's own qualifications, however. He cites a contemporary theorist of nationalism as arguing that because cultural nationalism is "often unable to extend beyond the educated strata,
[it] is forced to adopt state-oriented strategies by which to institutionalize its ideals in the social order" [p. 343] . Even though Makeham seems correct that the degree to which ruxue activities have been co-opted by state interests is still quite limited, this dynamic bears our close attention in the years ahead. At the same time, we should be careful not to see all cultural nationalist motivations as undermined by their reliance on an overly-broad conception of culture. It is true, as Makeham (following Thomas Metzger) notes, that a monolithic idea of "Chinese culture" has figured importantly (and problematically) in many of the arguments he has discussed [p. 339]. I hold no brief for those who insist that a single "Chinese culture" must remain intact and rooted in traditional Confucian views if a Chinese nation is to subsist, rather than be annihilated by Christianity or the West. Nonetheless I would argue that a concern for finding value in one's "own" traditions and heritage is a critical and legitimate motive for looking again at these traditions, even if by doing so in a new context that is also open to foreign traditions, one all but guarantees that the local traditions will be significantly changed in the process.
I suspect that Makeham agrees with me on this last point, yet would respond that insofar as the sort of dynamic I have just described were actually taking place, we should have witnessed more philosophical creativity. It is thus primarily in his fourth thesis that Makeham moves beyond mere description and throws down his gauntlet. As I said at the outset, Makeham's book represents a significant challenge to contemporary scholars of ruxue: if he is right that there has been a lack of philosophical creativity, why is that? Is philosophical creativity even important? If it is, are there signs that it might emerge in the near future? I will take these questions in order. Marxist frameworks and methodologies in the PRC; to this we can also add the lack of thorough historical and linguistic training. Over the entire period of Makeham's study, though, these problems are being solved. Second is the degree to which the paradigms of ruxue scholarshipincluding graduate education, dissertation topics, and criteria for professional success more generally -have not stressed creativity. Referring specifically to studies of New Confucianism in Taiwan, Makeham puts this point very strongly: "The significance of these sorts of papers…is the performative role they play in initiating younger scholars into the ritual norms prescribed by a broader community of scholars. Creativity is not a criterion for acceptance; incantation of ritually privileged phrases and theme is" [p. 86] . I worry that Makeham is here overstating an aspect that would be found in any instance of Kuhnian "normal science," but surely we can at least agree with him that the norms within a given realm of scholarship aim at enforcing a degree of concern with common vocabulary and problems.
The third reason for the lack of creativity is the one to which I feel we should pay the most attention. Philosophical creativity is sparked by an openness to ideas and critiques from outside of one's own tradition. This is as true of the history of Confucianism as it is of any The reasons for the lack of openness, mutual understanding, and dialogue are many; overcoming them will be key to the future of ruxue as a philosophical movement. Admittedly, some adherents of ruxue might not bemoan the demise of ruxue's philosophical ambitions.
Certain voices in the recent debate over the "legitimacy of Chinese philosophy" have suggested that to view ruxue as "zhexue 哲學" -the neologism coined to translated "philosophy" -is to capitulate to a Western ordering of the intellectual and cultural world, and to abandon ruxue's traditional claims to offer a system of values and practices that is much broader than academic philosophy. Other voices, though, have argued both that ruxue must adapt to a world that is radically different from Imperial China, and that one can simultaneously view contemporary ruxue as "philosophy" and in other, perhaps broader ways. Confucian learning played many different roles in earlier times; there is no reason that it cannot do so today. If ruxue is develop as philosophy, though, its students and scholars will have to open themselves to constructive engagement with philosophers from other traditions. Indeed, there are some recent signs that a process of mutual opening and mutual challenge is beginning, with Chinese and Western philosophers starting to collaborate on conferences and book projects that consciously cross traditions. As Makeham knows full well, the writing of very recent history is a dicey business.
Will the three decades he has canvassed eventually be seen as having laid the groundwork for a new flourishing of Confucian philosophy, or as a quixotic last gasp of a dying tradition? From our current vantage point, it is impossible to predict with any confidence what fate lies in store for Confucianism's lost soul.
